^This. It tries really, really hard to lay out a thesis that the sequence of bloody attrition battles in the Mediterranean really does deserve the emphasis accorded to it in traditional histories, attention far overshadowing the degeneration of the Wehrmacht in the bloodsoaked battles in the Axis-Soviet War. It really, really tries. Unfortunately it tries to lay out claims that are directly contradicted by the evidence. Such as the Mediterranean serving as a learning curve.....and then the Allied generals repeat the exact same mistake over and over again. Claiming that the generalship on the Western Front in Northwestern Europe was a higher order than that seen in the Mediterranean.....and ignoring that the Bocage, Aachen, the Huertgen Forest, Metz, the Scheldt.....all overqualify for the kind of foolish headlong attacks it says the generals learned against in the Mediterranean.
I give the writer props for trying to find the rose in the pile of bullshit. I really, really do. Unfortunately for it that rose simply put does not exist in anything like the term it says it does. Sure, it raises the point that much of the fighting here was politically motivated, but given the inelegant attrition war in the Western Front of WWII and two-thirds of the Eastern Front IOTL for much of *that* war I fail to see why or how I am to be convinced that the people repeating most of the same mistakes in 1944-5 somehow learned in 1939-43 what not to do, or why the argument that the Mediterranean was exaggerated in importance is discredited. The book contradicts itself.